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The socialist contribution to the creation of the European Economic Community has long
been overlooked and misunderstood. Existing scholarship emphasises short-term considerations
in explaining why the French Socialist and German Social Democratic Parties supported a
European Common Market in 1956–7. This article offers a new perspective by placing these
parties’ decisions within a longer context of socialist views on free trade, tariffs and regional
economic organisation. Based on fresh archival materials, this article explores how socialist
proposals for securing an economic peace after the First World War continued to influence
socialist policies on European economic integration in the 1950s.
In December 1950 socialist economic experts convened in a thirteenth-century
French monastery to discuss liberalising European trade. They met during a
period of considerable strain. Relations between the French Socialist Party (Section
française de l’Internationale ouvrière; SFIO) and German Social Democratic Party
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands; SPD) were at their lowest point since the
Second World War. The SPD had begun a rancorous campaign against the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), a French proposal supported by the SFIO. A
year before the SFIO had opposed the inclusion of West Germany in a six nation
customs union including France, an initiative supported by the SPD.
Despite this unpropitious background, SFIO and SPD economic experts presented
ideas about regional economic cooperation that, while not identical, had much in
common. German experts envisioned ‘the building of a single European economic
space [and] the removal of all barriers [and] tariffs’.1 The SFIO delegate, Robert
Lacoste, ‘aimed for competition through liberalisation’, adding that, ‘liberalisation
cannot proceed automatically, but as socialists we must continue to push for it until we
achieve a large Common Market’ [emphasis in the original]. The meeting concluded
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Socialists and European Economic Integration 259
with two-thirds of the delegations, including the SFIO and SPD, declaring themselves
‘very positive towards the liberalisation of foreign trade’.2
This article contends that SFIO and SPD conceptions of international trade
and organisation expounded at this meeting have their origin in their parties’
peace programmes developed during the First World War. Whereas the parties
had contrasting policies on trade before 1914, by 1918 both asserted that economic
protectionism leads nations to war. Disappointed by the emasculation of US President
Woodrow Wilson’s proposals for a liberal peace, in the 1920 and 1930s they developed
a woeful narrative of alternatives not taken. These alternatives, which married free
trade with regional organisation, became fixtures of interwar congresses, international
meetings and party programmes. During the Second World War these narratives
passed through personal contact and ideological affinity from one generation of party
leaders to another.
The article reinterprets SFIO and SPD support for the European Economic
Community (EEC), a six nation common market, by highlighting a long tradition
of socialist thought on trade liberalisation in transnational and national spheres. This
approach contributes focus and precision to the more abstract discussions of interwar
ideas of ‘Europe’ in studies by Willy Buschak and Tania Maync.3 It also accomplishes
several historiographical innovations. First, it rebuts claims that SPD support for the
EEC constituted what Gabriele d’Ottavio calls a ‘shift in the SPD’s European policy’,
‘a conversion’ according to Rudolf Hrbek, an ‘about-turn’ in Detlef Rogosch’s
phrasing or a rejection of former SPD leader Kurt Schumacher’s legacy as Paterson
argues.4 The argument here agrees with Jürgen Bellers who considers the SPD
decision ‘not as surprising as it seemed to the public at the time’ but it does not
credit the decision, as Bellers and D’Ottavio do, to the reformist impulses that led
to the 1959 Bad Godesberg party platform.5 It concurs with Talbot Imlay’s claim
that it represented ‘not a new departure as much as the logical outcome of earlier
developments’, but the decision was less a ‘foregone conclusion’ than Imlay suggests.6
2 Bericht über die fünfte Zusammenkunft der COMISCO-Wirtschafts-Sachverständigen vom 4.–8.
Dezember 1950 in L’Abbaye Royaumont, Frankreich, Gerhard Kreyssig (GK) 187, AdsD.
3 Willy Buschak, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa sind unser Ziel: Arbeiterbewegung und Europa im frühen 20.
Jahrhundert (Essen: Klartext, 2014); Tania M. Maync, ‘For a Socialist Europe! German Social Democracy
and the Idea of Europe: Recasting Socialist Internationalism, 1900–1930’, PhD, University of Chicago,
2006.
4 Talbot Imlay, ‘“The Policy of Social Democracy is Self-Consciously Internationalist”: The German
Social Democratic Party’s Internationalism after 1945’, The Journal of Modern History, 86, 1 (2014):
81–123; Gabriele d’Ottavio, ‘The Treaties of Rome: Continuity and Discontinuity in SPD’s European
Policy’, Journal of European Integration History, 13, 2, (2007), 105; Rudolf Hrbek, Die SPD, Deutschland
und Europa: die Haltung der Sozialdemokratie zum Verhältnis von Deutschland-Politik und West-Integration
(1945–1957) (Bonn: Europa-Union, 1972), 257; William E. Paterson, The SPD and European Integration
(Farnborough: Saxon House, 1974), 127; Detlef Rogosch, Vorstellungen von Europa: Europabilder in der
SPD und bei den belgischen Sozialisten 1945–1957 (Hamburg: Krämer, 1996), 243.
5 Jürgen Bellers, Reformpolitik und EWG-Strategie der SPD: Die innen- und aussenpolitischen Faktoren der
europapolitischen Integrationswilligkeit einer Oppositionspartei (1957–63) (Munich: Tuduv, 1979), 78; Bellers,
‘The German Social Democratic Party, II’, in Richard T. Griffiths, ed., Socialist Parties and the Question
of Europe in the 1950’s (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 79.
6 Imlay, ‘“The Policy of Social Democracy”’, 106–19.
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The article publishes excerpts of internal SPD debates where the crucial decisions
on the EEC Treaty were made in 1957.
Further, the analysis follows Imlay’s urging that scholars take international socialist
meetings seriously, unlike Richard Griffiths (and others) who argues that they were
‘inconclusive wrangle(s) . . . around pre-conceived, pre-rehearsed positions’.7 The
discussions were indeed often inconclusive but focusing on loose coalitions rather than
unanimous compromises reveals important achievements on issues of regional trade
liberalisation. Laurent Warlouzet rightfully argues that Socialist Prime Minister Guy
Mollet’s contribution to the EEC ‘has long been ignored’ in existing historiography.8
Not only did it matter that a ‘pro-European’ government negotiated the Treaties of
Rome, as Gérard Bossuat and Craig Parsons stress, but this article also demonstrates
how Mollet’s policy embodied a largely unbroken continuity in SFIO thought on
regional trade.9
The common market offered a framework for post-war cooperation between the
French and German governments, the states with the largest populations and most
important economies in continental Europe, and inaugurated the French-German
‘motor’ that has fuelled European integration until the present day. Based on fresh
research in national, socialist international, party and private archives, this article
explores why the SFIO and SPD, the largest parties of the non-communist left, voted
for the EEC treaty. Though Julia Angster and Michael Held discuss transatlantic
networks and Keynesianism in the 1930–1960s and Christian Bailey traces the interwar
origins of the SPD’s Ostpolitik, they do not focus on international trade or the
EEC.10 This continuity in international economic policy, though, is essential for
understanding party responses to the EEC. Without their votes, there was no majority
in either France or Germany to ratify the common market. Exploring party-level
continuities is therefore indispensable not only for explaining socialist policies on
European integration, but for analysing why a common market came into being in the
first place. Socialist votes for the EEC were not inevitable consequences of interwar
ideas. Nonetheless, interwar economic conceptions, reinforced at transnational
socialist meetings, provided legitimacy and inspiration for socialists to endorse a
European common market in 1956–7.
7 Richard T. Griffiths, ‘European Utopia or Capitalist Trap? The Socialist International and the
Question of Europe’, in Griffiths, ed., Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe, 9–11; Guillaume
Devin, L’Internationale socialiste: Histoire et sociologie du socialisme international (1945–1990) (Paris: Presse
de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1993); Talbot Imlay, ‘The Practice of Socialist
Internationalism during the Twentieth Century’, Moving the Social. Journal of Social History and the
History of Social Movements, 55 (2016): 17–38.
8 Laurent Warlouzet, Le choix de la CEE par la France: L’Europe économique en débat de Mendès France à de
Gaulle (1955–1969) (Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France, 2011), 34–5.
9 Gérard Bossuat, L’Europe des Français 1943–1959, une aventure réussie de la IVe république (Paris: Sorbonne,
1997); Craig Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).
10 Julia Angster, Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie: Die Westernisierung von SPD und DGB (Munich:
Oldenbourg, 2003); Christian Bailey, ‘Socialist Visions of European Unity in Germany: Ostpolitik since
the 1920s’, Contemporary European History, 26, 2 (2017): 243–60; Michael Held, Sozialdemokratie und
Keynesianismus: Von der Weltwirtschaftskrise bis zum Godesberger Programm (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus,
1982).
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French Socialists, German Social Democrats and the Economics of Peace
In 1889 the Second International, the Universal Peace Congress and the Inter-
Parliamentary Union (IPU) all held their founding congresses. A peace movement
dominated by liberal activists proposed international organisations to secure peace
among nations through binding arbitration, freedom of commerce and a ‘United
States of Europe’.11 Socialists heaped scorn on these ‘bourgeois apostles of peace’,
in the words of SPD theoretician Karl Kautsky, but also embraced many of their
ideas. The 1907 Second International congress supported binding arbitration. In 1911
Kautsky wrote that, ‘there is only one way’ to ‘ban the spectre of war’: ‘the union
of the states of European civilisation in a confederation with a universal trade policy,
a federal Parliament, a federal Government and a federal army – the establishment
of the United States of Europe’.12 The SPD’s peace resolution during the First
World War called for a ‘supranational organisation’ but, fearing a ‘victors’ peace’, the
party was ambivalent about Wilson’s 1919 proposal for a League of Nations, as Ulrich
Hochschild demonstrates.13 Radicals in the left-wing Independent Social Democratic
Party (USPD) opposed Wilson’s proposal but its moderate wing welcomed it, though
it preferred a supranational ‘European Bundesstaat’, or federal state.14 In France, the
SFIO embraced international organisation as a guarantor of peace at its 1915 congress
and endorsed a ‘League of Nations’ the following year. French socialists who were
not drawn to Vladimir Lenin’s call for international communist revolution generally
rallied around Wilson’s vision. When the war ended SFIO officials demanded a
‘socialist federal Republic of the United States of Europe’.15 The SPD turned to
Wilson as well, hoping for a mild peace.
The SFIO and SPD emerged from war espousing the classic liberal assertion that
free trade promotes peace among nations. This consensus was a product of the war.
Previously, their views on international trade shared little in common. The SPD was
an overwhelmingly urban, working-class party. French socialists, in contrast, built firm
roots in agrarian France. The parties responded differently when their governments
increased agricultural tariffs from the 1870s to 1890s. In France, socialists were ‘flexible
and pragmatic’ on tariffs and courted the farming vote. Protectionism became part
of France’s ‘liberal-democratic tradition’.16 To German social democrats, however,
tariffs represented the power of East-Elbian agrarian estates. The burden of tariffs
on urban consumers was higher in Germany than in France, feeding the SPD’s
class-based analysis.
11 Sandi E. Cooper, Patriotic Pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe, 1815–1914 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1991).
12 Karl Kautsky, ‘Krieg und Frieden, Betrachtungen zur Maifeier’, Die Neue Zeit, 29, 2 (1911), 97–107.
13 Ulrich Hochschild, Sozialdemokratie und Völkerbund: Die Haltung der SPD und S.F.I.O. zum Völkerbund
von dessen Gründung bis zum deutschen Beitritt (1919-1926) (Karlsruhe: Info, 1982), 13–26.
14 Georg Ledebour, Reichstagsprotokolle, 24 Oct. 1918, 6235.
15 Armand Charpentier, ‘Vision d’avenir’, Le Populaire, 20 Nov. 1918.
16 Rita Aldenhoff-Hübinger, Agrarpolitik und Protektionismus: Deutschland und Frankreich im Vergleich 1879–
1914 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002), 91–186.
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Hochschild perceptively argues that what distinguished the SFIO among French
supporters of the League was that ‘it understood [it] not only as a political and military
organisation to prevent war but also intended it to be for economic affairs’ though here
the argument is that socialists considered international economic organisation integral
rather than ancillary to their anti-war program.17 A 1916 SFIO resolution proposed
that a League of Nations prevent ‘prolonging the disasters of the European war in
an economic war’ and dismantle ‘excessive protectionism’.18 The SPD resolved in a
memorandum to an aborted 1917 international socialist meeting that, ‘the peace treaty
should . . . prevent the military war from being prolonged by an economic war’ and
‘gradually eliminate protectionism’ by ‘suppressing all restrictions of a tariff or com-
mercial nature’.19 A socialist party conference of the Entente powers in 1918 cham-
pioned ‘a League of Nations, which implies compulsory arbitration, in order to reach
general disarmament, and free trade in order to remove possible causes of conflict’.20
Socialist peace programmes merged support for international organisation and
free trade. This convergence facilitated the rebuilding of inter-party relations after
the war. In 1919 an international conference in Bern assembled to offer a socialist
alternative to the peace emerging from Paris. This was a dramatic meeting. For
the first time since 1914 French socialists met their German social democratic
counterparts. Tempers flared as the delegates debated the emotional question of
German responsibility for the war. Yet there was unanimity at the conference on free
trade and international organisation. The Bern resolution envisioned the League as
an international economic organisation invested with powers to regulate interstate
trade, approve or veto tariffs and ‘supervis(e) the world production and distribution
of food and primary resources’.21
Socialist Free Trade: Peace and Economic Renewal
After 1919 the SFIO and SPD advocated central planks of liberal internationalism.
Daniel Laqua emphasises the ‘blurred boundaries between’ interwar ‘socialist and
liberal internationalisms’, but he does not explore the economic dimension of these
socialist ‘politics of peace’.22 Stefan Feucht analyses SPD foreign policy under the
Weimar Republic, but economics takes a back seat to the Baltic question, the Ruhr
crisis, the Locarno treaty and disarmament, as it does in René Girault’s treatment
17 Hochschild, Sozialdemokratie und Völkerbund, 16.
18 Cited in ‘L’École socialiste, Cours de Pierre Renaudel, le 16 décembre 1930’, La Vie du Parti, 28 Jan.
1931.
19 Réponse de la délégation allemande aux questions posées par la conférence de Stockholm, 671 AP
18, Archives nationales, Paris; David Kirby, ‘International Socialism and the Question of Peace: The
Stockholm Conference of 1917’, The Historical Journal, 25, 3 (Sept., 1982): 709–16.
20 Proceedings of the Inter-Allied Labor Conference. London September 17, 18, 19, 1918 (Washington D.C.:
American Federation of Labor, 1918), 35.
21 Pierre Renaudel, L’Internationale à Berne: Faits et documents (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1919), 61–83.
22 Daniel Laqua, ‘Democratic Politics and the League of Nations: The Labour and Socialist International
as a Protagonist of Interwar Internationalism’, Contemporary European History, 24, 2 (2015), 175–92.
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of SFIO parliamentary leader Léon Blum’s European policy.23 This article will
demonstrate that economics were in fact central to socialist discussions on peace
in the 1920s. In its resolution rejecting the Versailles treaty, the SFIO declared that
‘tomorrow like yesterday, tariff barriers will separate territories . . . competition will
recover the bitterness of before [and begin again] the historical cycle: commercial
rivalry, diplomatic tension, unleashing of war’.24 In 1921 Blum supported extending
most favoured nation trading status to Germany to promote Franco–German
reconciliation.25 For the SPD’s leading economic thinker and two-time German
Finance Minister, Rudolf Hilferding, ‘this politics of disrupting international traffic
. . . the import-export ban, the high tariffs are so much more dangerous [because]
we know from historical experience that they fan the flames of state conflicts and
increase the likelihood of war’.26
Trade liberalisation contributed to three socialist goals: a peaceful international
system, economic modernisation and, especially for the SPD, lower consumer prices.
Modernisation seemed imperative to compete with the US internal market, which
experienced impressive growth in the 1920s. The SFIO developed a narrative of
an unambitious, lacklustre French industrial class obtuse to the requirements of
the international economy. Alexandre Bracke, the idol of post-war SFIO leader
Guy Mollet, railed against ‘economic Malthusianism’ in French industry as early as
1919.27 The German Metal Workers Union contended that post-war cartels in heavy
industry, discussed by Wolfram Kaiser in this special issue, stunted technological
modernisation.28 Trade union federations also pushed socialists to support free
trade. The General Federation of German Trade Unions (Allgemeiner Deutscher
Gewerkschaftsbund; ADGB) supported a European internal market to lower production
costs and to preserve peace.29 The General Confederation of Labour (Confédération
générale de travail; CGT), France’s largest union, favoured ‘a diffusion of products
throughout the world by means of rapid and free trade’.30 Under the impetus of
CGT leader Léon Jouhaux the International Federation of Trade Unions voted
to end ‘economic nationalism’ and to remove tariffs and subsidies for ‘doomed’
industries31 – preferences that the International Labour Organization also adopted as
Lorenzo Mechi demonstrates in this special issue.
23 René Girault, ‘L’Idée de la construction européenne dans l’œuvre de Léon Blum avant la Seconde
Guerre mondiale’, in René Girault and Gilbert Ziebura, eds., Léon Blum, Socialiste européen (Brussels:
Complexe, 1995), 71–83; Stefan Feucht, Die Haltung der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands zur
Aussenpolitik während der Weimarer Republik (1918–1933) (Frankfurt a.M: Peter Lang, 1998).
24 ‘À Propos de la ratification: Déclaration du groupe socialiste,’ L’Humanité, 3 Oct. 1919.
25 Blum, Journal Officiel de la République française, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des députés (JO), 13 Apr.
1921, 1608.
26 Maync, ‘For a Socialist Europe!’, 61, 145.
27 Bracke, ‘Coin de voile’, L’Humanité, 1 Feb. 1919.
28 Toni Sender, ‘Steigerung der Produktion’, Betriebsräte-Zeitschrift, 12 Apr. 1921.
29 Buschak, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa, 89.
30 L. Servière, ‘Les Chemins de fer et la Société des Nations’, Le Populaire de Paris, 31 Jan. 1919.
31 Patrick Pasture, ‘The Interwar Origins of International Labour’s European Commitment (1919–1934)’,
Contemporary European History, 10, 2 (2001), 221–37.
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International meetings nurtured this developing consensus into a core tenant of
the socialist politics of peace. The USPD and SPD reunification in 1922 precipitated
the re-founding of the Labour and Socialist International (LSI) in 1923. Invitations to
its founding congress in Hamburg demanded that all parties accept the 1922 Hague
Peace Congress’s resolutions, thereby officialising the rapprochement between liberal
and socialist internationalism.32 The LSI’s first resolution states that ‘the Peace Treaties
violate all economic principles . . . unrestricted protectionism . . . has balkanized
economically a Europe rent in pieces, and . . . added to the catastrophe’, concluding
that, ‘labour must . . . fight against protectionism and in favour of free trade’.33
When the French parliament contemplated new tariffs in 1927 the SFIO contacted
the socialist parties of Belgium, Germany and Switzerland to form a united front
against protectionism.34 A 1927 SPD-ADGB resolution on the World Economic
Conference listed three demands, the first of which was ‘the removal of restrictions on
international trade’.35 Fritz Napthali, an economic expert, wrote the SPD’s proposal
for the Third LSI Congress in 1928. He demanded ‘the removal of restrictions on
international trade, in particular inter-European trade’.36
The Weimar-era SPD presented itself as defender of a free-trade fortress besieged
by economic elites pursuing their interests at the expense of working-class consumers.
Tariffs fuelled internal polemics over participation in coalition governments.37 In the
SPD’s last period in office in 1928–30, frustrated SPD leaders were unable to break the
protectionist alliance in the government’s Foreign Trade Committee.38 Party leaders
were on the defensive at party congresses, beseeching delegates to understand that
they could not block the Reichstag majority’s support for higher tariffs. The situation
was more complex in France, where conflicting interests continued to influence SFIO
trade policy.39 The SFIO voted for tariffs on sectors as diverse as textiles, shoes, coal
and cars.40 However, the socialists behind these measures did not challenge the party’s
economics of peace, asserting instead that war damages, periodic or structural crises
and unfair competitive practices warranted temporary protectionist measures.
32 International Labour Congress of Socialist Parties. Hamburg 1923, ARCH01368.1, International
Institute for Social History (IISH), Amsterdam.
33 Motion 7, Resolution of the Committee on Point (1) of the Agenda, ARCH01368.7, IISH.
34 Copie d’une lettre envoyée aux partis Allemand, Belge et Suisse, 19 Mar. 1927, ARCH01368.1570,
IISH.
35 Entwurf vorgelegt von der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands gemeinsam mit dem
Allgemeinen Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbund, 23 Apr. 1927, ARCH01368.907, IISH.
36 Entwurf einer Entschliessung zum Wirtschaftsreferat für den Brüsseler Kongress. Vorgelegt von F.
Napthali (Berlin), ARCH01368.54, IISH.
37 Sozialdemokratischer Parteitag 1925, Heidelberg: Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Parteitages (Berlin: Dietz,
1925), 14–16 Sept. 1925, 196–221; Sozialdemokratischer Parteitag in Leipzig 1931 vom 31. Mai bis 5. Juni
im Volkshaus (Berlin: Dietz, 1931), 118–38.
38 Joachim Radkau, ‘Entscheidungsprozesse und Entscheidungsdefizite in der deutschen
Aussenwirtschaftspolitik 1933–1940’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 2, 1 (1976), 33–65.
39 See the discussions of the SFIO agrarian program, XXVIIe Congrès national tenu à Bordeaux les 8, 9, 10
et 11 Juin 1930 (Paris: Librairie Populaire, 1930).
40 ‘À la Chambre: La crise économique’, Le Populaire, 22 Dec. 1920; ‘Solidarité économique’, Le Combat
social, 27 Apr. 1930.
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Despite pragmatic concessions on tariffs, most revealing is how the SFIO and
SPD responded to the Great Depression. When political and economic liberalism
collapsed between 1929 and 1933, the SFIO and SPD became the largest political
forces in their countries committed to liberalising international trade. Both vigorously
supported a moribund ‘tariff truce’ in 1930. SFIO economic experts lamented the
world economy’s regression into a ‘mercantile system’, abandoning the ‘conquest[s]
of modern society’.41 In his notes for the Fourth LSI Congress in 1931, Blum listed
‘lowering tariff barriers’ as an ‘essential condition for an amelioration of the crisis’.42
Hilferding’s proposal stated that ‘the war was the launching point for economic
nationalism . . . protectionist policies, especially the constantly increasing tariff walls’.
He called for ‘an international tariff peace pact’ and a ‘convention to remove tariffs for
single goods’. Socialists, he said, should ‘support all efforts to build a single European
economic area free from tariff walls’.43
The next year Rudolf Breitscheid, the SPD’s parliamentary leader, dedicated a
significant portion of his speech to a LSI conference on disarmament to international
trade. ‘We experience with a shudder’, he said, how ‘ever more means are found
to close a country against others. . . . We know how these trade disputes are roots
for political disputes, political distrust, that contribute to raising walls between states
instead of tearing them down’.44 By 1933 world trade had collapsed to half its
1929 level. Once in power the Third Reich established an unprecedented system of
import restrictions. After the French Popular Front won the 1936 elections SFIO
Prime Minister Léon Blum concluded several commercial accords in an attempt to
alleviate international tensions, including with Nazi Germany, as Gordon Dutter
explores, but Blum soon concluded that trade concessions would not lure Adolf
Hitler’s government from its path towards war. Blum’s next government instead
undertook a mass program in French rearmament.45
Socialists, International Organisation and Economic Institutions
At the second LSI congress in 1925 in Marseilles, Hilferding argued that ‘we must
not only desire peace but organise it. Economic competition between nations for
the conquest of markets must be replaced by cooperation’, comments to which
Blum expressed his ‘entire agreement’, continuing that, ‘again in agreement with
Hilferding . . . we must counter national sovereignty with international organisation’
by granting the League of Nations ‘super-sovereignty above states’.46 The conference’s
‘Resolution on Unemployment’ stated that ‘the establishment of a stable and
41 ‘L’Année 1931 et la crise économique’, Faits et Chiffres, 25 Jan. 1932.
42 Blum. Pour la séance du Bureau de l’I.O.S., ARCH01368.653, IISH.
43 Kongress der S.A.I. 1931. Für die Kommission zu Punkt 3. Resolutionsentwurf, ARCH01368.168,
IISH.
44 Beilage 3, 23 May 1932, ARCH01368.910, IISH.
45 Gordon Dutter, ‘Doing Business with the Nazis: French Economic Relations with Germany under
the Popular Front’, The Journal of Modern History, 63, 2 (1991): 296–326.
46 Newspaper cut out, Maurice Bertre, ‘Au Congrès socialiste’, ARCH01368.44b, IISH.
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expanded market is . . . incompatible with . . . protectionism . . . the Congress
thinks that we must move towards organised exchange’.47 Hilferding and Blum
expressed similar thoughts at the LSI in 1931. Hilferding wrote, for instance, that ‘the
removal of unhealthy protectionism alone is not enough. On top of this is needed
international cooperation under the leadership of the League of Nations and the
International Labour Organization . . . to replace the chaos wrought by economic
nationalism with a well-planned order of world-wide exchange.’48
Hochschild discusses how, as early as 1919–20, socialists thought that the League
was inadequate to meet the challenges of peace, though he downplays the economic
dimension of their critiques. The League had no executive powers to resolve
economic problems, and Germany was excluded (it joined in 1926). A SFIO official
wrote in 1919 of his ‘disillusion’: ‘we cannot find the generous spirit of Wilson’s
messages, nor the necessary provisions for the League’s composition, action, and
role’.49 SPD leader Hermann Müller considered the League a ‘shameless humbug’.50
For his party the post-war settlement was a disaster. Thrust into power with Germany’s
defeat, it faced the bitter task of signing a peace treaty universally reviled in Germany.
Nonetheless, after 1921 the SPD supported German membership in the League on
the basis of an ‘equality of conditions’.51
Interwar SFIO and SPD leaders sought international remedies for the
reconstruction of war-damaged territories, for reparations, for raw material shortages
and for agricultural and industrial crises. Free trade required international institutions
to peacefully order economic relations among nations and mitigate negative domestic
repercussions. Ernest Poisson, a SFIO delegate to international meetings, argued in
1919 that Allied wartime boards to distribute food and primary materials should serve
as ‘the first embryos of an international trade organisation’.52 Former SFIO Minister
Albert Thomas called for an extension of ‘the role of the League of Nations in
the economic sphere’ and for the ‘international control of commerce’.53 Soon after
Thomas became Director of the International Labour Organization (1919–32). Under
SFIO influence the Lucerne international socialist conference resolved in August that
the League should supervise ‘credit, navigation, food, and primary resources’.54
A SFIO newspaper aptly described socialist views on international trade
as ‘a synthesis that borrows from free trade the notion of a world market
and from protectionism its notion of a directed economy’.55 The 1925 LSI
Congress rejected a false choice between ‘protectionism’ and ‘anarchic free-
trade’, demanding instead ‘organised trade . . . under the [League’s] control’.
47 Résolution sur le chômage, ARCH01368.31, IISH.
48 ARCH01368.168, IISH.
49 Marcel Cachin, ‘Le premier acte’, L’Humanité, 14 Feb. 1919.
50 Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands abgehalten in
Weimar vom 10. bis 15. Juni 1919 (Berlin: Vorwärts, 1919).
51 Protokoll der Sozialdemokratischen Parteitage in Augsburg, Sera und Nürnberg, 1922 (Berlin: Dietz, 1923).
52 Ernest Poisson, ‘Vers l’Organisation des échanges internationales’, Le Populaire, 2 Mar. 1919.
53 Albert Thomas, ‘Les solutions qui s’imposent’, L’Humanité, 7 July 1919.
54 ‘Au congrès du Lucerne’, L’Humanité, 16 Aug. 1919.
55 ‘La fin du libre-échange’, Le Combat social, 8 Nov. 1931.
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A ‘Collective International Economic Council’ would ‘regulate consumption,
international production, currency and transport relations, [and] raw material
distribution’.56 A year earlier, Blum proposed extending the League’s programme
for Austria to all of Europe: ‘an international issuing institute, a system of credit
for countries incapable of consuming or producing, perhaps an international money
supported by international taxes or loans’.57 When the depression struck, the SFIO
appealed for an ‘international bank’ to serve as ‘the central financial organism of the
future federated Europe’.58
Pre-war ‘free traders progressively convert[ed] to the regional solution’, as Eric
Bussière argues,59 and socialist internationalism merged with this evolution of liberal
internationalism. In 1925 the SPD became the first major European party to enshrine
the ‘United States of Europe’ into its party programme. For Breitscheid, the aim
was ‘a European customs union’.60 SPD chair Otto Wels proposed a ‘European
parliament’ in 1921 and then a United States of Europe at the first LSI Congress.61
When Germany shed the shackles on its trade sovereignty established by the Versailles
Treaty in 1926, the SFIO, the Belgian Workers Party (POB) and the SPD met to
discuss the future of European trade. Their resolution called for a European customs
union.62 Socialist statements supporting free trade, however, were almost always
followed by demands for more powerful international institutions, often modelled
on interventionist wartime economies. In his 1928 LSI speech Napthali regretted
that ‘right after the war a revival of liberal views came about as reaction against the
war economy’. ‘Meanwhile’, he continued, ‘almost everyone now recognises that the
hardest problems . . . can only be solved through . . . national and international or-
ganisations’. The resulting LSI resolution signalled socialists’ disappointment with the
1927 World Economic Conference and adopted the SPD’s call for an ‘International
Economic Office’ under the League that would ‘supervis[e] trusts and international
cartels’.63 In 1930 Napthali proposed that the LSI appoint an ‘international secretary
for economic policy’ who would reside in Geneva to lobby the League for the LSI’s
views on ‘international tariff policy . . . cartels [and] agricultural co-operation’.64
Blum sympathised with French Foreign Minister (and former socialist) Aristide
Briand’s 1929–30 call for a European customs union but criticised its vagueness
and reaffirmation of national sovereignty. The Briand Plan, lacking enforcement
mechanisms, seemed inadequate to address the growing tensions of the time. For
56 ‘Congrès de Marseille de l’Internationale Socialiste Ouvrière’, La Bataille, 6 Sept. 1925; Arthur
Crispien to SPD congress, Sozialdemokratischer Parteitag 1925, 17 Sept. 1925.
57 Blum, ‘Pourqoui le socialisme est internationaliste’, Le Combat social, 1 June 1924.
58 ‘La Drôme’, Le Combat social, 2 Feb. 1930.
59 Eric Bussière, ‘Premiers schémas européens et l’économie internationale durant l’entre-deux-guerres’,
Relations internationales, 123, 3 (2005), 51–68.
60 Breitscheid, Reichstagsprotokolle, 27 Nov. 1925, 4628.
61 Buschak, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa, 134, 241.
62 Ernest Poisson, ‘La Conférence de Bruxelles’, La Vie Socialiste, 18 Mar. 1926.
63 Point de l’ordre du jour, 671 AP 20, AN.
64 ‘Report by Comrade Napthali on the Establishment of an Economic Department of the I.F.T.U. and
L.S.I.’, 8 Jul. 1930, ARCH01368.853, IISH.
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the SPD the Briand Plan ‘was more a general conception than a concrete proposal’,
but a ‘healthy’ idea of ‘great worth’.65 The SFIO and SFIO also supported smaller
integration projects within Europe including, in principle, a customs union between
Austria and Germany. When proposed by the German government in 1931 without
international consultation, though, it was a ‘deplorable’ act of aggression, prompting
both parties to oppose it.66
In the 1930s ‘planning’ ideas percolated within socialist parties and trade unions as
alternatives to the apparent dynamism of Soviet and fascist examples, though they also
met with suspicion or rejection. When crisis struck French coal the SFIO supported
import quotas ‘for the moment’ but preferred a national coal board to fix prices and
organise trade.67 The best solution, though, was an ‘international organisation of the
coal industry’.68 When crisis hit French agriculture socialists voted ‘in desperation’
for minimum prices and tariffs but regretted their impact on consumers.69 In 1931
Adéodat Compère-Morel, author of the SFIO agrarian program, wrote that ‘it is
necessary that in the near future the representatives of European countries . . . create
a vast International Wheat Office to end these disorganised and dangerous oscillations
of wheat prices’.70 The Popular Front government, in the absence of international
solutions, established a Wheat Office in 1936 as a national interventionist body.
Reclaiming Europe for Socialism: Exile, Resistance and War
When the German military won the 1940 Battle of France, French socialists dispersed
to Algeria, London, home or underground. The party organisation dissolved. Soon
after Blum was imprisoned he wrote A l’échelle humaine, in which he portrayed the
League of Nations as a ‘magnanimous and magnificent creation’. A post-Nazi ‘world
must draw tomorrow a lesson from its defeat’ by creating a ‘Supreme State’ with
powers ‘distinct from and superior to national sovereignties’. Invested with ‘means
to borrow, [its own] budget’, it ‘must regulate the problem of customs, manage
currency crises perhaps with an international monetary institution’ and ‘undertake
massive works of international utility’.71
Slowly, a small socialist resistance formed around the Socialist Action Committee
(Comité d’action socialiste; CAS) in the Vichy South and around Libération-Nord
in the German-occupied North. Within these organisations socialist ideas about
international organisation and trade passed from interwar blumistes and anti-fascists to
the generation of post-war SFIO leaders. CAS leader Daniel Mayer was a Blum
disciple. Important figures in the Nord and Pas-de-Calais federations, home of
65 Buschak, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa, 158–85.
66 Salomon Grumbach, JO, 8 May 1931, 2669–70; for the SPD, see Feucht, Die Haltung der
Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, 498.
67 Raoul Évrard, ‘Il faut solutionner le problème minier’, Le Combat social, 27 Jan. 1935.
68 ‘Le Contre-projet socialiste pour l’équilibre budgétaire’, Faits et chiffres, 20 Mar. 1933.
69 Tanguy Prigent, ‘Le Socialisme et les paysans: La question du blé’, Le Combat social, 17 May 1936.
70 ‘Un Office de blé: C.M.’, Le Combat social, 25 Jan. 1931.
71 Léon Blum, A l’échelle humaine (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), 168–74.
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Libération-Nord, strongly supported Blum’s interwar foreign policy and argued for
international organisations with executive powers and for free trade.72 During the
war they rubbed shoulders with a younger generation of northern resisters, including
Gérard Jaquet and Christian Pineau, who survived the war to become forceful
advocates of European integration.
Ensconced in this web of personal ties Blum’s vision became the template for
the SFIO’s 1943 resistance manifesto laying out the party’s objectives for a post-war
peace.73 The manifesto called for a ‘super-state to which nations will cede part of their
sovereignty’, in particular over ‘the distribution of primary resources, emigration,
transportation, working conditions, hygiene, public works, customs legislation . . . and
monetary exchange’.74 This ‘political confederation must have its own government
. . . a budget, tax resources, borrowing capacities’. The SFIO resistance took up
Blum’s call to re-appropriate ‘Europe’ from its Vichy and National Socialist usurpers.
It endorsed a ‘United States of Europe’ as a step towards a ‘United States of the
World’, with the power to ‘supervise the problem of customs’.75 The clandestine press
promoted ‘unions of federation . . . of neighbouring states . . . to suppress monetary,
customs, and military borders and to manage their resources in common’.76 It also
saw ‘joyful’ signs for convergence with exiled German socialists, reprinting a 1944
resolution of the Organisation of German Socialists of Great Britain that stated, ‘we
advocate a Federation of all the peoples of Europe because full national sovereignty
is no longer compatible with the economic and political conditions of Europe’.77
German social democrats fractured into splinter groups during the National
Socialist dictatorship. Boris Schilmar discusses the broader exile community’s diverse
discourses on Europe, Paterson the exiled socialists’ ‘general agreement’ on European
federation and Bailey the importance of the International Socialist Combat League
(Internationaler Sozialistischer Kampfbund; ISK) in carrying support for a united Europe
into the post-war period.78 This section builds on their work by demonstrating
continuities in social democratic thought on international trade and organisation. It
departs from Paterson by rejecting the implicit break he sees between exiles and the
‘nationalist’ post-war SPD and, though it agrees with Bailey on this point, former
ISK figures were less relevant than Bailey suggests for the SPD’s ECSC policy than
72 Jean Lebas, ‘La leçon d’une crise’, Le Combat social, 5 Aug. 1934; Amédée Dunois, ‘Une esquisse de
politique internationale’, Bataille Socialiste, Feb. 1932.
73 Wilfried Loth, Sozialismus und Internationalismus: Die französischen Sozialisten und die Nachkriegsordnung
Europas, 1944–1950 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1977).
74 ‘Notre Programme’, Le Populaire. Édition Zone Nord, 16 Jan./1 Feb., 1943.
75 Daniel Mayer, Les socialistes dans la Résistance: Souvenirs et documents (Paris: Presses universitaires de
France, 1968), 222–36.
76 ‘Les Cahiers de Libération’, Le Populaire, fragment, undated.
77 ‘Vers les États-Unis du Monde: La politique internationale des Socialistes Allemands’, Le Populaire.
Édition Zone Nord, Apr. 1944.
78 William E. Paterson, ‘The German Social Democratic Party and European Integration in Emigration
and Occupation’, European History Quarterly, 5 (1975), 429–41; Boris Schilmar, Der Europadiskurs im
deutschen Exil 1933–1945 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2004); Bailey, ‘Socialist Visions of European Unity’.
at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777318000073
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 62.251.66.85, on 13 Apr 2018 at 13:45:06, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
270 Contemporary European History
Ruhr-based politicians like Fritz Henssler, as I have argued elsewhere, or Willi
Birkelbach and Erich Ollenhauer for the EEC, which is the focus here.79
Exiled social democrats saw no inherent contradiction between a united Europe
and a united world but the geographic contours of their vision shifted with the
vagaries of world politics. Many supported a post-war European federation; others
thought that federation must include the United States and/or the Soviet Union.
Hilferding, for instance, opposed a League of Nations for Europe in 1939. In
contrast, Heinz Kühn, later Minister President of North-Rhine-Westphalia, criticised
a ‘colourless world republicanism’ and supported regional federation. Georg Ritzel
and Wilhelm Högner of the organisation Europa-Union published a draft European
constitution in 1940 that envisioned a European union within a larger League of
Nations. After the war Ritzel continued as leader of Europa-Union and Högner
became the first Minister President of Bavaria.
The official exiled SPD (SOPADE) chaired by Erich Ollenhauer called for
supranational institutions and European trade liberalisation, as did the ISK and Neu
Beginnen. SOPADE declared in 1939 that ‘there must never again be a high-tariff
Germany’.80 Hilferding supported free trade within a European customs union and a
ban on raising tariffs. Willy Brandt of the leftist Socialist Workers’ Party of Germany
(Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands) and later SPD mayor of Berlin in 1957–66
and German chancellor in 1969–74 supported a ‘European planned economy’ based
on ‘economic disarmament’.81 Gerhard Kreyssig, an exiled economics expert close
to Ollenhauer, rejected the ‘sovereignty mania’ he claimed characterized the 1919–
20 peace settlement.82 He designed a European Trade Corporation, a European
Economic Community that would include a European Iron-Steel Community and
a European Coal Community in 1942–3. Small wonder, then, that Kreyssig was
delegated to represent the SPD when the ECSC Common Assembly opened in
1952.
(Dis)Continuities: Socialist Economic Visions in Post-War Europe
Post-war SFIO and SPD leaders had been socialised within their parties’ interwar
milieus. Mollet, a minor official, defeated Mayer in 1946 to become SFIO secretary-
general. His victory left SFIO European policy in place because, as Bossuat argues,
‘Mollet converted to Europe under the influence of Léon Boutbien and Léon Blum
(through the theory of internationalism)’.83 In Germany, Schumacher emerged from
79 Brian Shaev, ‘Workers’ Politics, the Communist Challenge, and the Schuman Plan: A Comparative
History of the French Socialist and German Social Democratic Parties and the First Treaty for
European Integration’, International Review of Social History, 61, 2 (Aug. 2016), 251–81.
80 ‘Protokoll der Parteivorstandssitzung am 5. Mai 1939’, in Ursula Langkau-Alex, Deutsche Volksfront
1932–1939: Zwischen Berlin, Paris, Prag und Moskau, Dritter Band (Berlin: Akademie, 2005), 400.
81 Ibid., 218–92.
82 Schilmar, Der Europadiskurs, 56-77, 169–87, 219–26.
83 Gérard Bossuat, ‘Léon Blum et l’organisation nouvelle de l’Europe après la Seconde Guerre mondiale’,
in Girault and Ziebura, eds., Léon Blum, Socialiste européen, 149.
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twelve years of imprisonment and hiding to lead the SPD. Ollenhauer became
Schumacher’s deputy and replaced him after Schumacher died in 1952. Despite
the long hiatus of National Socialist rule, post-war German social democrats had
maintained their affective ties to their party.
Emerging from war, the SFIO promoted trade liberalisation within international
organisations. When it concerned economics most often the party conceptualised
regional institutions. With a socialist-led coalitional government in power, Blum
wrote that liberalisation ‘creates the conditions for peace, whereas tariff wars
prepare the spirits for war’.84 The government also launched a state-directed
modernisation programme. Socialists insisted that there was no ‘contradiction
between the progressive return of free foreign commerce and an internal economic
regime founded on the direction of the economy [dirigisme]’.85 The party continued
to propose supranational institutions. In supporting the Marshall Plan the SFIO
announced that ‘dirigisme is absolutely indispensable at the international level’ and
welcomed the US government’s demand that European governments coordinate
their recovery programmes in what became the Organisation of European Economic
Cooperation (OEEC).86 It supported executive powers for the OEEC, which, it
argued, should not only liberalise, but organise trade through ‘the unification of taxes,
salaries and social security legislation’.87 Plagued by coal shortages, the SFIO urged an
‘internationalisation’ of European raw materials and heavy industry. François Tanguy-
Prigent, SFIO Agricultural Minister in 1944–7, drew inspiration from interwar SFIO
proposals to call for a European agrarian union in 1949, a year before an official
French proposal for a ‘green pool’.88
At the SPD’s founding post-war congress, Schumacher resurrected Wels’s call
for a ‘United States of Europe’. The SPD supported the Marshall Plan and
German entry into the OEEC on the basis of an ‘equality of conditions’. Kreyssig
renewed his support for a European customs union.89 Internal policy documents
in 1949 emphasised the ‘necessity of a European-regional connected economy’
and ‘striv[ed] for a true world economy on the basis of a regional (not nation-
state) connected economy’.90 Another document, titled ‘Supranational Economic
Relations’, favoured ‘planned, supranational economic relations as a foundation for
European-Union’.91 When Dutch Labour colleagues attended a SPD parliamentary
meeting in January 1950 Schumacher asserted that Europe should lower tariffs and
create a common currency, a united dollar pool and a European division of labour.92
84 Léon Blum, ‘La protection paysanne’, 1 Nov. 1946, in L’Oeuvre de Léon Blum, Vol. 7 (Paris: Albin,
1958), 329–32.
85 Francis Leenhardt, JO, 1 Aug. 1946, 2889.
86 Jean Le Bail, JO, 31 July 1947, 3571.
87 André Philip, JO, 6 July 1948, 4350–1.
88 Tanguy-Prigent, JO, 25 Feb. 1949, 953.
89 ‘Blöcke in Europa’, 20-12-49, GK 23, AdsD.
90 Entwurf eines Arbeitsschema für die Aufstellung eines Wahlprogrammes, GK 187, AdsD.
91 Johannes Petrick, Übernationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, GK 187, AdsD.
92 24 Jan. 1950, Bundesfraktion 1.1, AdsD.
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Nonetheless, growing domestic and international anxieties tempered SFIO and
SPD enthusiasm for regional integration. The British and Scandinavian governments,
governed by Labour and social democratic parties, refused to participate in
supranational institutions. SFIO and SPD leaders worried about the submergence
of socialism within continental institutions dominated by Christian democrats. The
SPD fretted that new economic borders on the North Sea would stymie growth in
German port cities, electoral strongholds. Both parties feared that a Franco–German
tête-à-tête could spell disaster. Further, Schumacher believed that his party had to steal
the thunder of anti-democratic forces by appealing to German national interests.
When French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed a supranational coal and
steel community in May 1950 each party hesitated before the SFIO announced
its support in June and the SPD its opposition in October. The SPD argued that
French governments intended to ‘colonise’ Germany, an argument that placed it in
an awkward position vis-à-vis the German Federation of Trade Unions (Deutscher
Gewerkschaftsbund; DGB). DGB leaders supported the ECSC after bargaining with
German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer for a law on workers’ participation in the
management of heavy industries.
When, in 1949–50, OEEC governments negotiated trade liberalisation, French
socialists complained that they should first integrate fiscal and welfare systems,
otherwise ‘anarchic and often disloyal competition’ would prejudice French industries
which had ‘[higher] social . . . and . . . production costs’.93 The SFIO shared
widespread concerns about French economic competitiveness and a narrative
that German industrial hegemony had driven Nazi expansionism. It insisted that
international institutions protect French ‘economic security’ vis-à-vis Germany.
Manufacturers’ pressure convinced the SFIO to pull its support for a customs
union with Italy and the Benelux countries in 1949 after Dutch leaders demanded
the inclusion of the new West German state. Lacoste summarised the French
government’s predicament:
the formation of a large European market is a necessity of our time because we are now facing
industrial and commercial dimensions that largely surpass national dimensions. . . . We cannot leave
Germany out. It is necessary therefore to have enormous guarantees. The export strength of the
German economy is such that we strongly risk winding up with a flooding of the French market
by German products.94
Reticence towards trade liberalisation grew within the SPD as well. In 1950–1
West Germany developed a massive balance-of-payments deficit after it entered the
European Payments Union (EPU), a multi-currency clearing house. SPD leaders
called for trade liberalisation to halt until conditions improved. Yet even a leading
proponent of the freeze, Erik Nölting, said that
93 1 and 7 Dec. 1949, Groupe parlementaire socialiste (GPS), Archiv d’histoire contemporaine (AHC),
Paris.
94 10 Nov. 1949, GPS, AHC.
at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777318000073
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 62.251.66.85, on 13 Apr 2018 at 13:45:06, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
Socialists and European Economic Integration 273
we are of course ‘old fighters’ for the idea of worldwide free trade. We are against superfluous trade
restrictions, we are for the integration of Western Europe as an economic union.95
Significantly, the parties continued to support trade liberalisation in international
conferences. The compromise ‘Resolution on the Liberalisation of Trade’ of the
1951 First Congress of the Socialist International (SI) in Frankfurt a.M. reflected
the success of the SFIO, the SPD and other parties in beating back proposals by the
British Labour Party.96 This congress was preceded by economic expert meetings, the
first of which published a resolution in March 1950 that rejected trade liberalisation.
Both the SFIO and SPD worked to change this resolution. Ollenhauer attended a
September meeting armed with a report that the SPD was more liberal on trade than
the German government, which it accused of protecting special interests (clearly the
agricultural sector). The SPD called on European countries to eliminate tariffs on
whole sectors of goods. West Germany would eliminate agricultural tariffs if nations
like France would eliminate industrial tariffs. The goal was ‘the preparation of a
customs union’.97
The SFIO, for its part, produced four documents for the December meeting
discussed at the opening of this article. One document expressed indirect approval
for the SPD’s call to end luxury goods imports during the EPU crisis. The other
documents clearly laid out the SFIO’s desire for regional trade liberalisation. Lacoste’s
report, titled ‘Trade Liberalisation’, demanded multilateral rather than bilateral trade
agreements, the ‘elimination of quantitative restrictions on imports’ and stated that
‘we, socialists, we agree with . . . the goal of achieving . . . a single European market’.98
The SFIO’s International Bureau prepared another document supporting trade
liberalisation that emphasised the importance of intra-European trade. Interestingly
for the outcome of the EEC negotiations which included a twelve-year transitional
period for the elimination of internal tariffs, the SFIO document concluded that
‘perhaps one can fix a delay – that could be around a dozen years – during which
political and economic measures can be taken to arrive at the final objective’.99 As
discussed above, the SPD and SFIO joined the two-thirds socialist majority that was
‘very positive towards the liberalisation of foreign trade’. The British, Danish and
Norwegian delegations opposed this statement and their countries did not join the
EEC in 1957.
95 Gegen die Zwangswirtschaft! Die wirtschaftspolitischen Vorschläge der SPD: Referat von Prof. Dr.
Erik Nölting, 1 Apr. 1951, Parteivorstand, AdsD.
96 Resolution über die Liberalisierung des Handels, Socialist International (SI) 350, IISH.
97 Die Liberalisierung der Wirtschaft b. Aussenhandel von dem Parteivorstand der Sozialdemokratischen
Partei Deutschlands, für die Konferenz Sozialistischer Wirtschaftsexperten (COMISCO) in Strassburg,
11–16 Sep. 1950, FH 43, AdsD.
98 Libéralisation des échanges (Rapport de Lacoste), SI 350, IISH.
99 Libéralisation des échanges, Rapport introductif presenté par la délégation française, SI 350, IISH.
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The EEC and Institutional Guarantees
The SPD made German reunification the centrepiece of its critique of Adenauer’s
government in the 1950s. During its raucous campaign against the European Defence
Community (EDC) in 1952–4, anti-EDC discourses and critiques of ‘small Europe’
collided with older discourses supporting regional economic integration. All the
while SPD economic experts promoted trade liberalisation because it would ‘multiply
the economic strength of Western Europe, markedly increase real income and . . .
working-class living standards’.100 After the German balance of payments crisis
subsided, the SPD promoted lower tariffs and the removal of all quantitative and
administrative restrictions in a 1953 resolution titled ‘Closer European Economic
Cooperation’.101 The SPD delegation to the ECSC Common Assembly also adopted
a constructive attitude. Birkelbach, a SPD delegate and future president of the
assembly’s transnational socialist group (1959–64), told his international colleagues
that, whereas agreement on geopolitical issues was difficult, ‘socialists can easily
reach agreement on the concrete economic and social questions dealt with by the
[ECSC] Assembly’.102 In 1955 Ollenhauer joined Jean Monnet’s Action Committee
and supported its campaign for a six nation supranational atomic energy community.
The SPD remained cautious though towards a six nation customs union because it
feared that it might become a protectionist bloc, dividing Europe, already split in
two, into three.
French governments were far more resistant to trade liberalisation than Germany
due to fears of industrial competition and widening French trade deficits in the EPU.
Socialist leaders, in opposition in 1951–5, supported deeper economic integration
but wanted institutional guarantees. The SFIO acknowledged French economic
problems in a 1952 report to the SI but praised the EPU for ‘maintain(ing) and
develop(ing) intra-European commerce’. Further, ‘it would be beneficial to orient
ourselves towards surpassing the dilemma of trade liberalisation and bilateralism by
proceeding further in the integration of Europe, that is to say, towards the creation of
a homogenous space subject to the same planning’.103 Pineau synthesised the SFIO’s
position in 1954, describing trade liberalisation as
first of all enlarging the market by opening to goods produced in Europe, a notion that is at the
base of most of our European conception. . . . On the European level, the free circulation of goods
ought to include as corrective an organisation of production so that competition does not become
murderous in the end for the states concerned . . . the term ‘liberalisation of trade’ should be
opposed to ‘protectionism’ and not to ‘organisation’.104
100 Memorandum der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands.
101 Fraktion der SPD im Bundestag, Antrag der Fraktion der SPD, Betr. Engere wirtschaftliche
Zusammenarbeit Europas, 23 Mar. 1953, Parteivorstand, AdsD.
102 Séance du 25 Septembre 1952, Confederation of Socialist Parties of the European Communities 13,
IISH.
103 Rapport général d’introduction, SI 352, IISH.
104 Pineau, JO, 6 Aug. 1954, 3927.
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Pineau’s comments are important because he oversaw the EEC negotiations as
French Foreign Minister (1956–8). His predecessor agreed to negotiations for a
European customs union at the Messina conference in June 1955, but it is not
clear whether the government wanted them to succeed. A powerful coalition of
politicians, industrialists, and ministry officials opposed the proposal. The centre-right
government coalesced around demands for ‘guarantees’ and social harmonisation.
For many, these were cudgels to sabotage the negotiations. Meanwhile, SPD deputy
Herbert Wehner supported the common market proposal in the name of the ECSC
Socialist Group.105
Griffiths has emphasised the conditions posed by French socialists to argue that
they were not predisposed towards the EEC before Mollet became prime minister.106
Mollet did tell the SI in July 1955 that ‘the final objective of the Six – a generalised
common market – will be achieved’ ‘only progressively’ ‘in a more distant future’.
Further, ‘it is necessary to overcome . . . French fears of increased foreign competition’
and ‘we would refuse any measures which would be permanently disadvantageous
in the short or long-term to a country’. These are words of caution but the first
statement anticipates the EEC’s transitional period and the second reasonably calls
attention to French interests. Mollet expressed ‘disappointment’ with the Messina
resolution, but his critique was that it envisaged a weaker supranational framework
than the ECSC, a point Wehner also made. Mollet privileged deeper integration
over widening to more countries, warned that time was running out and praised
liberalisation measures as ‘precious instruments in European recovery’. Finally, he
noted that ‘the creation of a common market . . . is generally regarded as a factor of
economic expansion and could also be the means of social progress’.107
Meanwhile, a SFIO Congress resolved that ‘French industry has been able to
shelter itself through protectionism to maintain its obsolete structures and entrench
itself in mediocrity’. Only ‘trade liberalisation . . . can incite these businesses to the
necessary modernisation effort, but it must be accompanied by . . . [measures against]
disloyal competition, whether they be dumping practices or intentionally backward
social legislation’.108 Then, in preparation for a November SI meeting on ‘Economic
Planning’, the SPD and SFIO prepared documents that shed light on their future
decisions on the EEC treaty.109 To the SI’s request to ‘please state your party’s position
on free trade, tariff protections and quota systems’, the SPD replied that it was not
‘dogmatic’ but ‘the party tends fundamentally towards free trade’.110 The SFIO, to
the question, ‘are import controls considered a permanent element of your country’s
economic system’, responded:
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NO. These controls are a consequence of the balance-of-payments deficit. Socialists . . . would like
an equilibrium of these balances that would permit trade liberalisation. They know however that
the balance of French trade has deep causes that will require a lot of time to eliminate.
The SFIO response continued:
The French Socialist Party would like trade to be liberalised, first within Europe, then in a larger
space. However, it thinks that this liberalisation requires conditions that are not currently met in
France and which it would dedicate itself to fulfilling if it were to take power.111
A month later, a left-leaning coalition won the French national elections. Mollet
became Prime Minister in January 1956 after promising to pursue common market
negotiations in his investiture speech. The new French leaders continued to insist
that European institutions mitigate the negative consequences of trade liberalisation.
Gradually, though, ever-moving targets became goals to achieve, rather than pretexts
for delay. Mollet gave Pineau a green light to pursue ‘guarantees’ in tenacious
negotiations in August–October 1956. When the talks stalled Mollet assiduously
marked up notes on the French negotiating position in preparation for a November
1956 meeting with Adenauer.112 Mollet’s pro-EEC position was strengthened by an
ILO report that rejected making social harmonisation a precondition for a European
common market, as discussed by Mechi, and ministerial reports arguing that social
costs only had a marginal impact on price disparities between France and other ECSC
economies.113
A breakthrough agreement in Mollet’s meeting with Adenauer included funds for
retraining workers, reconverting uncompetitive enterprises, a European Investment
Bank, equal pay for female workers and greater flexibility in the customs union’s
transitional stages in the event of economic difficulties.114 The agreement contained
fewer ‘guarantees’ than those sought by the French delegation, but far more than those
envisioned at Messina. Mollet and Pineau considered them sufficient to implement
their economic vision, rooted in interwar SFIO preferences, that trade liberalisation
would foster peace and modernise France’s economy. To ratify the EEC treaty they
reconstructed the centrist majority that had dominated French policy-making until
1952, including the Christian democratic Mouvement Républicain Populaire, now in
opposition, pro-European radicals and right-wing deputies who supported Mollet’s
hard line in Algeria. Bossuat, Parsons and Warlouzet are therefore validated in their
assessment that Mollet and Pineau were decisive for the EEC treaty against scholars
like Alan Milward and Andrew Moravcsik who downplay the importance of pro-
integration actors.115 This success, though, had as much to do with long-held socialist
ideas on regional trade liberalisation as their general pro-European attitudes.
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SPD leaders meanwhile pondered whether to support a six nation common
market. Ollenhauer told the party that it could still reject the treaty but he tipped
the scales towards the EEC, reflecting that ‘it would be bad for the party to refuse in
the economic field that which it has always pushed for’.116 Wilhelm Mellies argued
that economic integration would endanger prospects for reunification.117 However,
Wehner, who oversaw SPD policy on the German Democratic Republic, thought
that the party ‘must be for the European Economic Community and the customs
union’, though the association of colonial territories concerned him. In the end
Wehner abstained. Later Mellies said the party should ratify the EEC Treaty for
tactical reasons as federal elections approached.
Tariffs were central in the SPD’s internal discussion. Baade urged rejection,
warning that ceding sovereignty over tariffs would likely result in higher tariffs.118
In February 1957 SPD economic experts debated whether to make their support
conditional on a prior agreement between a British-inspired free trade area and
the EEC. The British government’s clumsy attempts to derail the EEC negotiations
informed the position the SPD adopted.119 The party supported an OEEC-wide
free trade area but SPD leaders knew that the British government had proposed it in
order to pre-empt the customs union. Birkelbach told the meeting that:
there is in truth only one project because the idea of the Free Trade Zone was only developed by
countries with special concerns about the Common Market. As for us, in truth, we have already
given up the argument [against] ‘small Europe’.120
In May the experts officially recommended that ‘we cannot . . . ignore the multiple
arguments brought forward that the greatest possibility is that without the erection
of a common market the Free Trade Area will under no circumstance be built’.121
Birkelbach’s view prevailed again in the party’s Central Committee meeting later that
month. An optimistic Karl Mommer thought that, ‘we can support the treaty. . . . The
Free Trade Zone will come and then tariffs will fall, as we have long demanded’.122
SPD leaders perceived their choice to be between this custom union, hopefully to be
expanded, or no European economic integration and no trade liberalisation. Presented
with a rather vague treaty and uncertain about the prospects of a larger free trade
area, the SPD voted with the CDU/CSU in July to ratify the EEC treaty.
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Conclusion
Six nations ratified the Treaties of Rome in 1957. In retrospect, there was only a
narrow window for success. In 1955 the Messina proposals did not have majority
support in the French National Assembly. Nor did Charles de Gaulle, who became
French prime minister in June 1958 and then President in December, support
supranationalism. Adenauer’s CDU/CSU won an absolute majority in September
1957. By that time the Bundestag, with SPD votes, had approved the EEC treaty
over the votes of Adenauer’s coalitional allies, the Free Democratic Party (Freie
Demokratische Partei; FDP). The CDU/CSU could have ratified the treaty without
SPD votes in fall 1957 but, if the six nation process had been delayed to 1958, the
treaty may have fallen victim to the disintegrative forces that buried the French Fourth
Republic.
Short-term considerations offered incentives for the SFIO and SPD to support
the EEC. After holding out for German reunification, by 1957 SPD leaders were
more pessimistic than ever. The Soviet invasion of Hungary bolstered Adenauer’s
contention that only a ‘policy of strength’ could deter Soviet aggression. Schumacher
believed that opposing the ECSC and EDC would bring the SPD electoral rewards,
but European integration was a political success by 1956–7. For Ollenhauer, opposing
the EEC would be a liability in the 1957 election. In France, Mollet experienced a
series of political reversals in autumn 1956. Socialist critics began to abandon him due
to his government’s disastrous military escalation in Algeria and the French-British-
Israeli invasion of Egypt. Mollet no doubt urgently desired a foreign policy success
when he met Adenauer to discuss European integration.
Viewed in a longer perspective, however, SFIO and SPD decisions reflected party
preferences for regional economic cooperation originating in the peace programmes
of the First World War, when the parties advocated free trade and international
organisations. In the 1920s socialists argued that tariffs, war by another means,
should come under the supranational governance of the League of Nations or of
a European customs union. After 1945 the Cold War division of Germany, the
challenges of reconstruction and the recalcitrance of northern European governments
towards supranationalism changed the post-war calculus. In 1955–7, however, older
preferences for European economic cooperation rose to the surface. This time, when
SFIO and SPD leaders contemplated a six nation common market, they prioritised
socialist ideas about international trade and organisation passed down by a previous
generation and still firmly entrenched in party ideology and programmes.
These ideas continued to shape socialist approaches to European integration
in the next decade. In 1958 de Gaulle suspended negotiations for an association
between the EEC and a British-led free trade group. A rival European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) of the so-called ‘outer seven’ countries was founded in 1960.
In 1963 de Gaulle vetoed Britain’s application to join the EEC, ignoring objections
from a wide swath of European public opinion, including from French and German
socialists. Despite these setbacks the SPD embraced the EEC and argued for stronger
supranational institutions than those desired by Adenauer, as did the SFIO. The SPD
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also remained eager to liberalise beyond the EEC. The successful conclusion of the
Kennedy Round negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
which lowered tariffs between the United States and the EEC by an average of 35
per cent, mollified concerns of the community becoming a protectionist bloc.
In the late 1960s French socialist and German social democratic views on
European integration increasingly diverged. Brandt, foreign minister (1966–9) and
then Chancellor (1969–74), promoted a deepening and widening of the EEC. With
Karl Schiller as finance minister, the SPD pursued a liberal approach to international
trade, a legacy that Helmut Schmidt continued as Chancellor (1974–81). The SFIO,
by contrast, was in decline in the 1960s, struggling to fashion a centre-left majority
to win the presidency of the Fifth Republic. In 1971 the SFIO dissolved into the new
Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste; PS), led by François Mitterrand. He supported the EEC
but the party became increasingly critical of the ‘capitalist’ Community. A socialist–
communist alliance won the 1981 presidential elections. President Mitterrand tried to
build socialism within the nation state while keeping France in the EEC. When his
project failed, Mitterrand ‘turned’ to Europe, giving impetus to the Single European
Act and the Maastricht Treaty, landmark agreements that established today’s EU.
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